Nietzsche's Early Metaphysics.

[Sauwelios]

The fundamental concept of Nietzsche's early metaphysics is the primordial One. "One" is here a nominalised adjective and is neuter. It may be relevant to note that originally, the word "god", too, was neuter. The primordial One is the "God" of Nietzsche's early metaphysics. One should remember at all times though that It is immanent, not transcendent.

The primordial One has Being (as opposed to "Becoming") and suffers from it. This suffering is a suffering from over-fulness, over-joyedness: the primordial One aches for lack and woe. It therefore imagines a world of Becoming, lack, and woe. This imagined world, this vision, is not outside It, but It is immanent to it: it is the world as we know it---the world we are a part of. The world as we know it is an imaginary self-fragmentation of the primordial One; we are really only imaginary fragments, and only have reality in being one with the primordial One.

This world of Becoming, lack, and woe, which Nietzsche usually calls "Nature" (and which he personifies, hence the capital N), itself also aches for something. Contrary to the primordial One, Whose ache's alleviation it is, it aches for Being, fulness, and joy. And this ache is again alleviated by imagination: by Apollinian illusion. This illusion is not only the alleviation of Nature, but also the complete redemption of the primordial One. For the primordial One delights in seeing Its "creatures" (most notably human beings) at ease in the illusion of Being. This happiness of Nature/Becoming in the illusion of Being transfigures the primordial One's own Being: Being now seems something desirable, indeed, the highest good. What delusion! This identication of the good, the beautiful, and the true in Being is the furthest away from the truth and therefore the most desirable. This illusion is truly the highest good and the most beautiful beloved. But only for the primordial One. For us, it is beautiful and good, but only as a relief from Becoming, not as a transfiguration of Being. In order to partake in the delight of this transfiguration, we must put ourselves in the place of the primordial One.

The highest form of the illusion of Being in the midst of Becoming is attained by the Apollinian genius. It is for the sake of this genius that the State exists. All human organisations larger than the family ultimately exist solely for this purpose, and even the family ultimately derives its worth solely from compensating for any deficiencies the State may have (hence in Plato's perfect State, the family was to cease: for it would no longer have been of any use).

But there is also another kind of genius, and this has in itself nothing to do with the State. It is the Dionysian genius. The genius of the Dionysian genius consists in his being able to put himself in the place of the primordial One. The supreme achievement of the exclusively Dionysian genius is experiencing the world as we know it as the primordial One experiences it: as an alleviation of the torment of Being, overfulness, and overjoyedness in the illusion of Becoming, lack, and woe. But this achievement is not the supreme human achievement. The supreme human achievement is the supreme achievement of the both Dionysian and Apolllinian genius. This genius can at the same time put himself in the place of the primordial One and create Apollinian images.

[N]ow Apollo approaches him and touches him with his laurel. The sleeper's enchantment through Dionysian music now begins to emit sparks of imagery, poems which, at their point of highest evolution, will bear the name of tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs. [Source: Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, chapter 5.]

[O]nly in the work of art that is the tragedy do we hear that highest twin art which, in its union of the Apollinian and the Dionysian, is the image [Abbild] of that primordial enjoyment of the eye of the world. [Source: Nietzsche, fragment of an advanced form of The Birth of Tragedy.]

[Fixed Cross]

The fundamental concept of Nietzsche's early metaphysics is the primordial One. "One" is here a nominalised adjective and is neuter. It may be relevant to note that originally, the word "god", too, was neuter. The primordial One is the "God" of Nietzsche's early metaphysics. One should remember at all times though that It is immanent, not transcendent.

The primordial One has Being (as opposed to "Becoming") and suffers from it. This suffering is a suffering from over-fulness, over-joyedness: the primordial One aches for lack and woe. It therefore imagines a world of Becoming, lack, and woe. This imagined world, this vision, is not outside It, but It is immanent to it: it is the world as we know it---the world we are a part of. The world as we know it is an imaginary self-fragmentation of the primordial One; we are really only imaginary fragments, and only have reality in being one with the primordial One.

On which ground is the primordial One posited? In other words, why does there have to be such an entity, why must there be one being representing a totality of all becomings?

Is it possible to distinguish this entity from God?

The distinction transcendent/immanent does not seem to apply here, as the primordial Ones undivided being is in fact transcendental from the perspective of becoming, which, as I understand it, is reality.

This world of Becoming, lack, and woe, which Nietzsche usually calls "Nature" (and which he personifies, hence the capital N), itself also aches for something. Contrary to the primordial One, Whose ache's alleviation it is, it aches for Being, fulness, and joy. And this ache is again alleviated by imagination: by Apollinian illusion. This illusion is not only the alleviation of Nature, but also the complete redemption of the primordial One. For the primordial One delights in seeing Its "creatures" (most notably human beings) at ease in the illusion of Being. This happiness of Nature/Becoming in the illusion of Being transfigures the primordial One's own Being: Being now seems something desirable, indeed, the highest good. What delusion! This identication of the good, the beautiful, and the true in Being is the furthest away from the truth and therefore the most desirable. This illusion is truly the highest good and the most beautiful beloved. But only for the primordial One. For us, it is beautiful and good, but only as a relief from Becoming, not as a transfiguration of Being. In order to partake in the delight of this transfiguration, we must put ourselves in the place of the primordial One.

"Lack and woe" but also overcoming, joy. If the joy of overcoming lack was not greater than the suffering fo the lack itself, would life, as subjects, becomings, persist? If the answer is no, then world of becoming is necessarily a world of pleasure and fulfillment as much as / more so than lack and woe.

The highest form of the illusion of Being in the midst of Becoming is attained by the Apollinian genius. It is for the sake of this genius that the State exists. All human organisations larger than the family ultimately exist solely for this purpose, and even the family ultimately derives its worth solely from compensating for any deficiencies the State may have (hence in Plato's perfect State, the family was to cease: for it would no longer have been of any use).

But there is also another kind of genius, and this has in itself nothing to do with the State. It is the Dionysian genius. The genius of the Dionysian genius consists in his being able to put himself in the place of the primordial One. The supreme achievement of the exclusively Dionysian genius is experiencing the world as we know it as the primordial One experiences it: as an alleviation of the torment of Being, overfulness, and overjoyedness in the illusion of Becoming, lack, and woe. But this achievement is not the supreme human achievement. The supreme human achievement is the supreme achievement of the both Dionysian and Apolllinian genius. This genius can at the same time put himself in the place of the primordial One and create Apollinian images.

[N]ow Apollo approaches him and touches him with his laurel. The sleeper's enchantment through Dionysian music now begins to emit sparks of imagery, poems which, at their point of highest evolution, will bear the name of tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs. [Source: Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, chapter 5.]

[O]nly in the work of art that is the tragedy do we hear that highest twin art which, in its union of the

Apollinian and the Dionysian, is the image [Abbild] of that primordial enjoyment of the eye of the world. [Source: Nietzsche, [u]fragment of an advanced form of The Birth of Tragedy

If the world of becoming is primarily one of lack and woe, Is the Dionysian genius possible without the Apollinian genius? Thus, is the Dionysian genius not always the Lyrical genius? If not, how could a subject completely affirm its suffering without positing an idea(l), an understand-as-good of some kind as its 'meaning'?

Is "Dionysus" not itself an Ideal?

[Sauwelios]

On which ground is the primordial One posited? In other words, why does there have to be such an entity, why must there be one being representing a totality of all becomings?

Well, all becomings together logically amount to a single being, at least through time ("block time").

Is it possible to distinguish this entity from God?

The distinction transcendent/immanent does not seem to apply here, as the primordial Ones undivided being is in fact transcendental from the perspective of becoming, which, as I understand it, is reality.

Well, it is the totality of all becomings, as you put it; i.e., it's not transcendent to the world of Becoming.

For that reason, the primordial One cannot be distinguished from a God as such, only from a transcendent God.

This world of Becoming, lack, and woe, which Nietzsche usually calls "Nature" (and which he personifies, hence the capital N), itself also aches for something. Contrary to the primordial One, Whose ache's alleviation it is, it aches for Being, fulness, and joy. And this ache is again alleviated by imagination: by Apollinian illusion. This illusion is not only the alleviation of Nature, but also the complete redemption of the primordial One. For the primordial One delights in seeing Its "creatures" (most notably human beings) at ease in the illusion of Being. This happiness of Nature/Becoming in the illusion of Being transfigures the primordial One's own Being: Being now seems something desirable, indeed, the highest good. What delusion! This identication of the good, the beautiful, and the true in Being is the furthest away from the truth and therefore the most desirable. This illusion is truly the highest good and the most beautiful beloved. But only for the primordial One. For us, it is beautiful and good, but only as a relief from Becoming, not as a transfiguration of Being. In order to partake in the delight of this transfiguration, we must put ourselves in the place of the primordial One.

"Lack and woe" but also overcoming, joy. If the joy of overcoming lack was not greater than the suffering fo the lack itself, would life, as subjects, becomings, persist? If the answer is no, then world of becoming is necessarily a world of pleasure and fulfillment as much as / more so than lack and woe.

Yes: lack and woe which spur to overcoming, to joy---which in turn is found only in imaginary fulness/Being. But the joy itself is not imaginary, no. Neither is the primordial One's, by the way.

If the world of becoming is primarily one of lack and woe, Is the Dionysian genius possible without the Apollinian genius? Thus, is the Dionysian genius not always the Lyrical genius? If not, how could a subject completely affirm its suffering without positing an idea(l), an understand-as-good of some kind as its 'meaning'?

Is "Dionysus" not itself an Ideal?

The Dionysian genius affirms his own personal suffering, and that of all other subjects he sees suffer, from a transpersonal perspective---the perspective of the primordial One. Thus he---He---affirms personal suffering as a relief from the torment of true Being, overfulness, and overjoyedness.

[Fixed Cross]

I can understand this as a religion, as a reversal of the pathological will to suffer. The need for the will to inflict suffering. Attaining this will this in the name of a super-entity whose existence explains everything (else).

But I can not explain this entity. I can see a four dimensional block of time, but not as a subject. Only as a subjects attempt to objectify subjectivity.

[Sauwelios]

I can understand this as a religion, as a reversal of the pathological will to suffer. The need for the will to inflict suffering. Attaining this will this in the name of a super-entity whose existence explains everything (else).

But I can not explain this entity. I can see a four dimensional block of time, but not as a subject. Only as a subjects attempt to objectify subjectivity.

In a way Its whole problem is that It's a subject without an object. This is what drives It to imagine Its fragmentation into many subjects which are each other's objects.

[Fixed Cross]

If its existence is problematic to begin with I see even less reason/cause to hypothesize this all encompassing subject.

How is attributing this existential problem to this god different from saying that he can not exist? Are you not metaphorically illustrating that the universe can not be thought of as subjective?

[Sauwelios]

If its existence is problematic to begin with I see even less reason/cause to hypothesize this all encompassing subject.

How is attributing this existential problem to this god different from saying that he can not exist? Are you not metaphorically illustrating that the universe can not be thought of as subjective?

Logically the whole cannot be a (i.e., one) subject, as a sub-ject presupposes something under which it is thrown (an ob-ject, something that is thrown before it (cf. "under-stand")).

Nietzsche's solution to this is that the primordial One is all subjects (and thereby all that exists).

The primordial One is a solution to the problematic character of existence as we know it---the problem of suffering. The suffering inherent to existence as we know it is justified as the solution to a prior and deeper problem: the problem of Being, of overfullness and overjoyedness.

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